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Abstract. The increasing popularity of web-based applications has led to sev-
eral critical services being provided over the Internet. This has made it impera-
tive to monitor the network traffic so as to prevent malicious attackers from  
depleting the resources of the network and denying services to legitimate users. 
This paper has presented a mechanism for protecting a web-server against a dis-
tributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. Incoming traffic to the server is con-
tinuously monitored and any abnormal rise in the inbound traffic is immediately 
detected. The detection algorithm is based on a statistical analysis of the in-
bound traffic on the server and a robust hypothesis testing framework. While 
the detection process is on, the sessions from the legitimate sources are not dis-
rupted and the load on the server is restored to the normal level by blocking the 
traffic from the attacking sources. To cater to different scenarios, the detection 
algorithm has various modules with varying level of computational and mem-
ory overheads for their execution. While the approximate modules are fast in 
detection and involve less overhead, they have lower detection accuracy. The 
accurate modules involve complex detection logic and hence involve more 
overhead for their execution, but they have very high detection accuracy. Simu-
lations carried out on the proposed mechanism have produced results that dem-
onstrate effectiveness of the scheme.   
Keywords: Distributed denial of service (DDoS), traffic flow, buffer, Poisson 
arrival, Queuing model, statistical test of significance.  
1   Introduction 
A denial of service (DoS) attack is defined as an explicit attempt by a malicious user 
to consume the resources of a server or a network, thereby preventing legitimate users 
from availing the services provided by the system. The most common DoS attacks 
typically involve flooding with a huge volume of traffic and consuming network  
resources such as bandwidth, buffer space at the routers, CPU time and recovery cy-
cles of the target server. Some of the common DoS attacks are SYN flooding, UDP 
flooding, DNS-based flooding, ICMP directed broadcast, Ping flood attack, IP frag-
mentation, and CGI attacks [1]. Based on the number of attacking machines deployed 
to implement the attack, DoS attacks are classified into two broad categories: (i) a 
single intruder consumes all the available bandwidth by generating a large number of 
packets operating from a single machine, or (ii) the distributed case where multiple 
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attackers coordinate together to produce the same effect from several machines on the 
network. The latter is referred to as DDoS attack and owing to its distributed nature, it 
is very difficult to detect.  
In this paper, a robust mechanism is proposed to protect a web server from DDoS 
attack utilizing some easily accessible information in the server. This is done in such a 
way that it is not possible for an attacker to disable the server host and as soon as the 
overload on the server disappears, the normal service quality resumes automatically. 
The detection algorithm has several modules that provide flexibility in deployment. 
While the approximate detection modules are based on simple statistical analysis of 
the network traffic and involve very less computational and memory overhead on the 
server, the accurate detection module is based on a statistical theory of hypothesis 
testing that has more overhead in its execution.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents some existing 
work in the literature on defense against DoS attacks. Section 3 describes the compo-
nents of the proposed security system and the algorithms for detection and prevention 
of attacks. Section 4 presents the simulation results and the sensitivity analysis of the 
parameters of the algorithms. Section 5 concludes the paper while highlighting some 
future scope of work. 
2   Related Work 
Protection against DoS attacks highly depends on the model of the network and the 
type of attack. Several mechanisms have been proposed to solve the problem of DoS 
attacks. Most of them have weaknesses and fail under certain circumstances.  
Network ingress filtering is a mechanism proposed to prevent attacks that use 
spoofed source addresses [2]. This involves configuring the routers to drop packets 
that have illegitimate source IP addresses. ICMP traceback messages are useful to 
identify the path taken by packets through the Internet [3]. This requires a router to 
use a very low probability with which traceback messages are sent along with the 
traffic. Hence, with sufficiently large number of messages, it is possible to determine 
the route taken by the traffic during an attack. IP traceback proposes a reliable way to 
perform hop by hop tracing of a packet to the attacking source from where it origi-
nated [4]. Yaar et al. have proposed an approach, called path identifier (Pi), in which 
a path fingerprint is embedded in each packet, enabling a victim to identify packets 
traversing the same paths through the Internet on a per packet basis, regardless of 
source IP address spoofing [5]. Pushback approaches have been proposed to extract 
attack signatures by rate-limiting the suspicious traffic destined to a congested link 
[6][7]. Mirkovic et al. have proposed a scheme named D-WARD that performs statis-
tical traffic profiling at the edge of the networks to detect new types of DDoS attacks 
[8]. Zou et al. have presented an adaptive defense system that adjusts its configura-
tions according to the network conditions and attack severity in order to minimize the 
combined cost introduced by false positives [9]. Client side puzzle and other pricing 
algorithms are effective tools to make protocols less vulnerable to depletion attacks of 
processing power [10].  
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3   The Major System Components and Algorithms 
This Section describes the traffic model and the attack model on which the proposed 
security system has been designed. One of the most vital components of the proposed 
system is known as the interface module. Various components of this module are also 
described in this Section.  
3.1   Traffic Model and Attack Model    
In the proposed traffic model packets from the network refers to small independent 
queries to the server (e.g., a small HTTP query or an NTP question-answer). For sim-
plicity, it is assumed that every query causes the same workload on the server. Since 
the query packets cause workload on the server, after a certain time the server cannot 
handle incoming traffic any further due to memory and processing overloads. 
Let us suppose that the attacker uses A number of hosts during the attack. When  
A =1, the attack originates from a single source, and when A >1, it corresponds to a 
distributed attack. There are one or more human attackers behind the attacking sources. 
These attacking sources are machines on the Internet controlled (taken over) by the 
attacker. It is assumed that the attacking machines use real addresses, and they can es-
tablish normal two-way communication with the server, like a host of any legal client. 
The human attacker hides behind the attacking machines in the network, which means 
that after carrying out the attack and after removal of all compromising traces of attack 
on the occupied machines, there is no way to find a trace leading to him/her. 
Two types of sources are distinguished: legal sources and attacking sources. There 
are N(t) legal sources and A(t) attacking sources in time slot t. In the proposed model, 
the attacker can reach his/her goal only if the level of attacking traffic is high enough 
as compared to the level under normal operation. It is assumed that the attacker can 
control the extra traffic by changing the number of attacking machines and the traffic 
generated by these machines. It is also assumed that the attacker is powerful and can 
distribute the total attacking traffic among attacking machines at his/her choice. The 
reason for using several attacking machines is to make it more difficult for the server 
to identify and foil them. However, when the attacker uses more machines, it becomes 
more difficult for him/her to hide the attack. Therefore, the attacker needs to keep the 
number of attacking hosts at a small value, i.e., A(t) should not be too large.  
3.2   The Interface Module 
A DDoS interface module is attached to the server at the network side. The interface 
module may be a software component of the server, a special-purpose hardware in the 
server host, or an autonomous hardware component attached to the server. 
The incoming traffic enters a FIFO buffer. For the purpose of modeling and analy-
sis a discrete time model is assumed. Traffic is modeled and processed over unit time 
slot. The server CPU processes μ storage units per time slot from the buffer. Since the 
buffer is fed by a random traffic, there is a non-zero probability of an event of buffer 
overflow. When a DDoS attack is launched, the incoming traffic quickly increases 
and the buffer becomes full. At this time, most of the incoming packets will be 
dropped and the attacker becomes successful in degrading the quality of service of the 
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server. However, the server host will not be completely disabled at this point of time. 
The goal of the interface module is to effectively identify and disrupt the traffic from 
the attacking sources so that the normal level of service may be restored.  
It is assumed that there are two states of the incoming channel: the normal state, 
and the attack state. While in the normal state, there is no DDoS attack on the server, 
in the attack state, the server is under a distributed attack. Let us assume that the at-
tack begins at time t*, and at time t* + δ, the interface buffer becomes full. At this 
time, the TCP modules running at the legal clients and the attacking hosts observe that 
no (or very few) acknowledgements are being sent back by the server. In order to 
defend against the DDoS attack, the first task is to detect the point of commencement 
the attack by making a reliable estimation of the time t*. 
Once the time of commencement of the attack is estimated, the next task is to iden-
tify the sources of the attack, and to disrupt the traffic arriving from these sources to 
the server. In the proposed scheme, this identification has been done based on the 
statistical properties of the traffic flow. The interface module at the server identifies 
all active traffic sources, measures the traffic generated by these sources, and classi-
fies them into different sets. In order to get reliable measurements of the traffic level, 
these measurements are carried out during time slots between t* and t* + δ. Conse-
quently, the effectiveness of the mechanism is heavily dependent on the time duration 
δ. During the time δ, the traffic flow between the sources and the server is not af-
fected, i.e., the interface module in the server does not disrupt traffic from the attack 
sources. It is obviously desirable to have a large value for the time duration δ so that 
more time is available for traffic measurement. A large value of δ can be effectively 
achieved by using a very large buffer size. It is assumed that the total buffer size (L) 
of the server consists of two parts. The first part (L1) is designed to serve the normal 
state of the server. The size of L1 is chosen according to the service rate of the server 
and the normal probability of packet loss due to the event of a buffer overflow. The 
size of L2 corresponds to the excess size of the buffer introduced with the purpose of 
gaining enough time for traffic measurements during the start-up phase of the attack 
for identification of the attack sources. 
It is assumed that the attack begins at time t*, i.e., all the attacking sources start 
sending packets at this time onwards. It is also assumed that the network was in nor-
mal state at any time t < t*. Let tˆ  denote the expected value of t*. For the sake  
of simplicity, it is assumed that the set of active sources is constant during the period 
of the attack. Let Tn(t) be the aggregate network traffic from the legal sources (i.e., the 
normal network traffic), and Ta(t) be the aggregate of the attacking traffic. Let  
the mean (per time slot) values of the normal and the attack traffic are λn and λa  
respectively.  
                               nn tTE λ=))((    aa tTE λ=))((                                      (1) 
Similarly, let the corresponding standard deviations be denoted by σn and σa. Let Q 
denote the apriori unknown ratio between λn and λa, i.e.   Q = λa / λn. As the time of 
commencement of attack (t*) is earlier than the time of its detection ( tˆ ), some pre-
cious time is wasted that cannot be used for traffic measurements. To minimize, this 
loss, the aggregate traffic level is estimated continuously by using a sliding window 
technique. The interface module in the server handles two sliding time windows. The 
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longer window has a capacity of wl slots, and the shorter one has a capacity of ws 
slots. In this way, both an extended-time average level λ (t) and a short-time average 
level λˆ (t) of the incoming aggregate traffic per slot at time slot t are estimated. 
3.3   Algorithms of the Interface Module 
The interface module in the server executes two algorithms in order to identify the 
DDoS attack and the attacking sources. The algorithms are: (i) algorithm for detection 
of an attack, (ii) algorithm for identification of the attack sources and disruption of 
traffic arriving from the attack sources. In the following the algorithms are described.  
3.3.1   Algorithm for Attack Detection 
In order to ensure high availability of the server, an early detection of an attack is of 
prime importance. As discussed in Section 3.2, the beginning of an attack is assumed 
to take place at time tˆ . An approximate determination of tˆ  can be done in any of the 
following two ways: (i) tˆ  is the point of time when the buffer L1 becomes full. (ii) tˆ  
is the point of time when the following inequality holds: 
                                     )ˆ()1()ˆ(ˆ trt λλ +>                                                      (2) 
In the inequality (2), r > 0 is a design parameter. It represents the maximum value of 
the fraction by which the short-term average of traffic level may exceed the long-term 
average without causing any alarm for attack on the server. In Section 4, the compara-
tive analysis of the effectiveness of the two approaches in detecting a distributed at-
tack is presented with simulation results. However, for a more accurate and reliable 
identification of an attack, a statistical approach based of hypothesis testing is also 
proposed. In this approach, a large sample of packet arrival pattern on the server is 
taken for a long duration. The packet arrival rate (PAR) at each sample duration is 
periodically measured and the sample mean ( X ) and the sample standard deviation 
( )ˆS  of the PAR are computed using (3) and (4). 
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After the computation of X  and Sˆ , one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test is 
applied to test if the samples come from a population with a normal distribution. It is 
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found that P- values for all K-S tests are greater than α = .05. Therefore, it is con-
cluded that the PAR follows a normal distribution. In other words, X  is normally 
distributed with an unknown mean, say, μ. The standard value of X  is given by (5): 
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In (5) Z is a standard normal variable and satisfies (6): 
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In equation (6) α is the level of confidence which satisfies 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. From (6) it is 
clear that there is a probability of 1- α of selecting a sample for which the confidence 
interval will contain true value of μ. 2/αZ  is the upper 100 α/2 percentage point of 
the standard normal distribution. The 100(1- α)% conf. interval of μ is given by (7): 
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The confidence interval in equation (7) gives both a lower and an upper confidence 
boundary for μ. To detect an attack scenario, a threshold value called maximum packet 
arrival rate (MPAR) is defined which distinguishes the normal PAR and the high 
PAR in an attack. In order to find MPAR, the upper confidence bounds for μ in (7) are 
obtained by setting the lower conf. bound to -∞ and replacing 2/αZ  by αZ . A 100(1- 
α)% upper confidence bound for μ is obtained from (8). The value of α in (8) is 0.025. 
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Let μ1 and μ2 denote the population means of two traffic flows. The t-test is applied to 
determine the significance of the difference between the two means, i.e. (μ1 - μ2). Let 
the difference between the two means be ( )21 XX − , and the standard deviation of 
the sampling distribution of differences is )(
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Since the two groups may contain different sample sizes, a weighted variance esti-
mate t-test is used. The weighted variance is computed in equation (10): 
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The resultant t-statistic is computed in equation (11): 
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To detect attack traffic, the following hypotheses are tested. The null hypothesis H0: 
μ1 = μ2 is tested against the alternative hypothesis H1: μ1  ≠ μ2. Levene’s test is used to 
assess H0. If the resulting P-values of Levene’s test is less than a critical value (0.05 
in this case), H0 is rejected and it is concluded that there is a difference in the vari-
ances of the populations. This indicates that the current traffic flow is an attack traffic. 
As will be evident in Section 4.2, this accurate statistical algorithm has 100% detec-
tion accuracy in all simulation runs conducted on the system.  
3.3.2   Algorithm for Identification of Attack Sources 
It is essential to disrupt the traffic emanating from the attack sources at the interface 
module of the server after an attack is detected. For this purpose, the interface module 
must be able to distinguish between the traffic from the attack sources and the normal 
traffic from legitimate client hosts. It is assumed that the interface module can meas-
ure the traffic characteristics of all the active sources at each time instance by recog-
nizing their network addresses. Starting at time tˆ , the traffic level corresponding to 
every source is measured. If an attack was correctly identified, i.e. t* < tˆ  < t* + δ, 
traffic measurement and analysis can be made over the period (t* + δ - tˆ ). Let the 
aggregate level of traffic be λˆ r (t* + δ), and the traffic for the source i be λˆ (i) (t* + 
δ). As the exact traffic from the legal sources during the attack cannot be determined, 
the expression λ ( tˆ - c), (c > 0), is used as an estimate of mean aggregate traffic level 
of the legal sources in time interval [t*, t* + δ], and an estimate for the mean aggre-
gate traffic level of the attacking sources ( λ a) is derived as in equation (12): 
                             )ˆ()*(ˆ cttra −−+= λδλλ                                         (12) 
The set Z of active sources is decomposed into two mutually disjoint sets Zn and Za, 
where the former is the set of legal sources and the latter is the set of attacking 
sources. The sets Z, Zn and Za will satisfy equation (13): 
                        an ZZZ U=
  
φ=an ZZ I
                                     (13) 
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The identification algorithm produces as output a set Za*, which is a subset of the set 
Z and very closely resembles the set Za. The closer the sets Za and Za* are, the more 
accurate is the detection of the sources of attacks. The identification of the attacking 
sources is made by the following two ways: 
(i) In this approach, the maximal subset of Za* = {i1, i2,…….iL} of Z is computed 
that corresponds to sources with the highest measured traffic levels so that the ine-
quality (14) is satisfied. The set  Za* contains the attack sources. 
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The basis principle for this method is that the attacker always tries to hide him-
self/herself, and therefore limits the number of attacking sources (A(t)). At the same 
time, to make the attack effective, the attacker intends to send a high volume of attack 
traffic to the server. Thus, there is a trade-off with the volume of the attack and the 
number of attack sources.  
(ii) In this method, the sources from the set of traffic sources Z which are active 
during the interval ( tˆ  - c), c > 0, are omitted and (14) is used to identify the attack 
sources. 
Once the attacking sources are correctly identified, the disruption of the traffic ema-
nating from the attack sources is done. For this purpose, all the incoming packets with 
source addresses belonging to set Za* are disarded.   
4   Simulation and Results 
The simulation program is written in C and the program is run on a workstation with 
Red Hat Linux version 9 operating system. A MySQL database is used for storing 
data related to traffic. The time interval is set at 10-6 seconds. The simulation is done 
with first 100 seconds as the normal traffic. The attack simulation is started at the 
100th second and is allowed to continue till the 200th second. The simulation is ended 
with another 100 seconds of normal traffic to test efficacy of the recovery function of 
the system. The traffic arrivals are modelled as Poisson process. The packets are 
stored in a buffer and are passed on to the CPU for further processing by the interface 
module. The queue type is assumed to be M/M/1. The inter-arrival time and service 
time are negative exponential distributions. Following cases are considered:  
Case 1: For a small corporate server, the number of legal clients is low, say N(t) = 
5. Assuming that the capacity of the server is high, the average load on the server will 
be less. Therefore, the number of attacking hosts should be high, say A(t) = 40. 
Hence, in this scenario, for an effective attack we must have N(t) << A(t). 
Case 2: For a server of medium size, it may be assumed that N(t) = 50 and a suc-
cessful attacker can launch his/her attack from a fewer number of hosts. Thus it may 
be assumed that A(t) = 50 in this case. As the number of legal clients and the number 
of attacking sources are of comparable size, it is easier for the attacker to hide his/her 
attack in this case. Therefore, in this situation,   N(t) ≈ A(t). 
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Case 3: For a global portal server, there can be a very large number of legal clients, 
say N(t) = 10000. In this situation, it is not possible for that attacker to easily estimate 
the required number of attacking hosts. In this case, it is assumed that the attacker 
chooses a reasonably high value of A(t), say A(t) = 5000, and opts for a very high 
attacking rate: λa = λn*10. Therefore, in this case:  N(t) > A(t). 
Table 1. Simulation parameters for Simulation I 
Parameter Value 
Number of legal clients (N(t)) 
Number of attacking hosts (A(t)) 
Mean normal traffic rate (λn) 
Mean attack traffic rate (λa) 
Service rate (μ) (packets/sec) 
10000 
5000 
0.1 
0.4 
1500 
The simulation parameters are listed in Table 1. With 10000 legal clients and λn = 
0.1, the capacity of the server should be at least 1000. However, the attack is success-
ful only when the service rate (μ) is less than 3000 (λa*A(t) + λn*N(t)). The value of μ 
is, therefore, taken as 1500. The buffer size for normal situation is taken as 40 packets 
i.e., L1 = 40 (packets). For choosing the size of L2, it is observed that the normal traffic 
rate is 1000 packets/sec. Thus a safe value of L2 = 3000 (packets) is taken. The values 
of the parameters of the detection algorithm are given in Table 2. The available time 
for traffic analysis depends on the value of δ. In the simulation work, a constant value 
( δδ ≤ˆ ) for this parameter is used for traffic analysis. It is assumed that the total 
traffic (normal and attack) is known and its value is Tn + Ta = 3000. As the service 
rate (μ) is 1500, one can expect the buffer L1 to be full after 40/(3000-1500) ≈ 0.3 
seconds. The whole buffer (L= L1 + L2) will be full in 30040/(3000-1500) ≈ 200 sec-
onds. Therefore, a safe estimation of δˆ  = 10 is made. In real world situation, δ 
should be estimated over a period of time. For simplicity, the value of δˆ  is set equal 
to ws. The algorithm presented in Section 3.3.2 is used for identification of the  
attacker. 
Table 2. Parameters of the attack detection algorithm 
Parameter Value 
Sliding window size (ws) 
Tolerance for traffic jump (r) 
Time frame for last correct value of λ 
10 sec 
0.6 
45 sec 
4.1   Simulation I 
Table 3 shows the results of the simulation with different values of the window size 
(ws). It is clear that a larger window size and hence a large δ gives a more accurate 
identification of attacks. However, with a larger window size the system is more 
likely to enter into a situation of buffer overflow. After the buffer overflow, the detec-
tion algorithm will produce very inaccurate and unreliable results. Therefore it is 
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Table 3. Results of Simulation I 
Observed metrics                                  δˆ (δˆ = ws) 
  5 10 20      30 40 
Correctly identified attackers    2982 3784 4529 4784 4892 
Filtered legal clients  1 557 260 132 59 
Dropped packets  0 0  0 14251 28765 
Max. buffer level and  
corresponding time frame 
29717 
(200 s) 
14941 
(110s) 
29732 
(119s) 
30040 
(120s) 
30040 
(120s) 
Time to restore (after  t*)     149 104 73      71 81 
 
not worthwhile to increase the window size beyond a limit. On the other hand, when 
the time window is too short, the algorithm can detect only a very small proportion of 
the attacking hosts. In summary, the results In Table 3 show that the mechanism can 
detect an attack with a window size of 10 seconds. 
4.2   Simulation II 
In this case, a smaller system is simulated with parameters are listed in Table 4. The 
buffers L1 and L2 are chosen as 40 and 160 respectively. The value of δ is set equal to 
ws, i.e. .10ˆ == swδ  The remaining parameters are kept the same as in simulation I.  
In simulation II, experiments are repeated on 500 different sets of input data to 
have an insight into the statistical properties of the system under normal and attack 
situations.  With different data sets, it is observed that the approximate algorithm (ii) 
in Section 3.3.1 was faster in detecting the attack in 454 cases. In 42 cases, the attack 
was correctly identified by both algorithms (i) and (ii) in Section 3.3.1. The accurate 
detection algorithm presented in Section 3.3.1 could detect all the 50 attack sources in 
all the 500 simulation runs. Table 5 summarizes the simulation results. 
Table 4. Parameters for Simulation II 
Parameter  Value 
Number of legal clients (N(t)) 
Number of attacking hosts (A(t)) 
Mean normal traffic rate (λn) 
Mean attack traffic rate (λa) 
Service rate (μ) (packets/sec) 
50 
50 
0.1 
0.2 
8 
Table 5. Results of Simulation II 
Observed metrics Observed values 
 Min Avg Conf. Int. (95%) 
Traffic restoration time  (after t*) 49 114.732 1.942 
Packets dropped  0 0.695 0.321 
Normal user filtered  (type II error) 1 7.115 0.231 
Number of attackers filtered 21 32.413 0.235 
Attack detection time (after t*) 0 2.95 0.09 
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5   Conclusion 
In this paper, a mechanism is presented for detection and prevention of DDoS attacks 
on a server. Different algorithms are presented for attack detection based on statistical 
theory of hypothesis testing. While the proposed mechanism does not affect the traffic 
from legitimate clients, it effectively blocks traffic from the attack sources. The simu-
lation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism. 
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